running public silences on a violent past. 1 The central query of the paper is as follows:
How has the politics of silence on the past translated into space, shaping the physical record of violence, and how has it transformed over time, especially in the post-war period characterized neither by open suppression nor overt action on the past? Uniquely, the paper approaches its topic through the lens of materiality of memory.
There is a profound gap in the literature on this topic with existing transitional justice debates revolving predominantly around public preferences for justice versus forgiveness and silence on the past, or alternatively local conflict resolution mechanisms. 2 Yet materiality can provide not only a fresh but also an extremely useful perspective on the ways in which memory, commemoration and power interlock after war. Within this broader nexus, the paper specifically explores the local post-war struggles against the erasure and displacement of memory as reflected in the ways in which the material remnants of a violent past struggle against new layers of developmental, infrastructural build-up and political disincentive. While such practices of obliteration-through-development have been documented through human reports in many regions including Latin America, Asia and Africa, there is a striking absence of academic analysis..
The story of transitional justice in Burundi is one of absence before and during the civil war, and one of a political deadlock thereafter. After the war, active suppression of memory has given in to an ostensibly supported but politically fraught and stalled 1 The public inaction and silence in Burundi is a notably prolonged one, spanning more than five decades of political violence from independence in 1962 to much after the end of the civil war (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , we could argue up till today. process of transitional justice. 3 What has emerged is a 'good enough peace' coupled with a 'rhetorical adherence to a global transitional justice paradigm'. 4 The deadlock on the past has to do with the careful power sharing between elites all of whom are implicated in the past of violence. 5 The political deadlock has translated into the sphere of public commemoration as well.
Burundi remains outside the 'global rush to commemorate atrocities,' 6 the 'flourishing "monument phenomenon."' 7 The study here thus bypasses the burgeoning literature on the politics of museums, memorial and public statuary, and the controversies over memory where commemoration has been launched after war and genocide. 8 The situation in Burundi contrasts starkly with neighboring Rwanda for example where the government has erected didactic memorials of the jenoside, and where the landscape is dotted with memorials and the year with commemorative events. On the other hand, Burundi's story is not quite one of 'absent monuments' 10 either and the paper takes care in comparing sites of violence that differ markedly in terms of demarcation and commemoration. In other words, there are levels to silence and recognition, amount of commemorative practice or resistance in Burundi today and in the past. To foreground this gradation, and using Kenneth Foote's typology, 11 the paper will consider a 'designated' site (clearly marked as a space of memory) under direct threat of obliteration from above, a 'rectified' site (one returned to its prior use without sign or ceremony) demanding designation from below, and an 'obliterated' site, the result of indirect effacement, never marked and now to be turned into private use.
Despite the differences, the paper will demonstrate and explain how in all three spaces memory is under threat of suppression. As will be shown, after the war people struggle against a more multifaceted and ambiguous attack on the past, glanced here through the dislodging of the material indexes of violence -memorials, memorial graveyards and victims' remains.
To structure its analysis, the paper deploys and revisits the notions of the public secret, the labor of the negative and truth as revelation. In his book Defacement, 12 and based on long-term research among Colombian communities affected by violence, Michael Taussig offers us incisive analytical tools with which to trace the workings of memory suppression in contexts such as Burundi. 13 For Taussig, whose definitions serve here as starting points, public secret and the labor of the negative refer to 'negative knowledge' or to the practice of 'knowing what not to know.' Public secret is that which is 'generally known but cannot be articulated.' 14 Reversing the Foucauldian accent on knowledge as power, Taussig brings our attention to power through public oblivion or disarticulation.
But we need to push Taussig further. If in its broadest sense 'labor of the negative' points to effacement of memory, then we must acknowledge there are modulations in its form. While 'knowing what not to know' was indeed key to power of Burundi's regimes prior to the end of the war and the dominant form of memory erosion, the labor of effacing the past has transformed and diversified so that there are multiple labors of negative at play today and these do not necessarily depend on negative knowledge.
From dense suppression of the past under the one-party ethnocracy, erosion of memory proceeds under an ostensible political consent to a process of public retrieval and recognition. The past is instead threatened by the lack of its de facto protection and articulation. In the post-war period, the labor of the negative thus manifests in more subtle forms that have to do with physical and symbolic (dis)placement of remains and indirect obliteration. But do such forms cease to produce power as the ability to proceed 'as if not' and the desired state of impunity?
To demonstrate the changing nature of the labors of the negative, the paper traces three sites as these confront different forms of memory erosion ranging from physical disposal of remains (at hill Zege), misplacement of remains (at Kivyuka), to symbolic delinkage (at Bugendana).. Importantly, in none of these cases is public secret the main motor of memory's erosion. In neither case do power and meaning reside in the act and fact of public exposure. Rather than simply seeing, showing, knowing, what matters from a local perspective is representing and acknowledging in particular forms and spaces. Thus if there is one running line throughout the paper, it must be Walter 14 Ibid., 5.
Benjamin's observation that truth is not a 'matter of exposure of the secret, but a revelation that does justice to it.' 15 The methodology underlying this paper is qualitative and grounded in the perspectives of ordinary Burundians. The fieldwork for this research was conducted between 2013 and 2015 in the provinces of Gitega, Bubanza and Bujumbura. The methodology is qualitative and ethnographic and combines a number of data-gathering techniques. In addition to semi-structured interviews with rural Burundians and civil society representatives, the research also draws and informal exchanges and observation in all sites and memorials discussed, as well as primary and secondary materials. The longerterm scope of the project allowed for repeated visits to a number of sites and follow-up interviews with some of the key participants.
Histories of silence and informal commemoration
The memory-scape in Burundi has been 'a politicized milieu' throughout its history. 16 Across more than five decades and despite the war's end, a structure of silence and impunity has continued to undermine a public project of commemoration. As a result, commemorative initiatives have been privatized, informal and hidden. Despite this broad continuity, we can distinguish between four distinct phases of memory practice during Burundi's independent period. The first phase, just after independence in the 1960s, saw construction of monuments to heroes and dignitaries as was common elsewhere in the early nation-building period. Even during this time, politically motivated killings were present, though these were not discussed in public. There were no major civilian casualties.
15 quoted in Taussig, supra n 3 at 8. 16 Over time then, there was a gradual shift from 'celebrating "great men" to commemoration of civilian casualties' but the latter tendency was politically inflected, partial, and minimal in scope. 25 The civil war has also created a competitive victimhood war period saw the construction of 'monument-cemeteries restricted to one massacre and one ethnic group.' 27 It still remains difficult to unwork this legacy despite recent attempts at creating cross-victim association platforms such as CARAVI.
The last phase of memory practice can be dated to the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement, which has made a number of provisions for transitional justice 28 and a few on commemoration more specifically. 29 But the progress has been stalled and politicized.
Justice mechanisms have been completely sidelined, and a widely criticized TRC draft law was only passed in 2014. The new TRC was finally established just ahead of the controversial 2015 elections and the last section will critically question whether this event spells a major shift in the dynamics observed in this paper.
The post-war prevarication from above has been met with a greater push from below.
But the work of local associations has been directly frustrated by the government.
Ceremonies have been subject to government authorization and rarely granted. The government has systematically denied requests for registration of associations, for exhumations and 'end of mourning' ceremonies. The public silence on the past has thus continued, despite an overt change of course and a rhetorical commitment to a truth and reconciliation process. where human remains were 'accidentally' unearthed during construction work, in Bugendana infrastructural development directly threatened to displace both people and memory by delinking them from place.
The labor of the negative thus proceeded differently in Bugendana than in the two other cases where actual physical delinkage and displacement has already occurred. People in Bugendana were haunted by the spectre and intimations of removal. Interviewee after interviewee impressed on me their unwillingness to be moved from the site and return 'home' to their hills of origin. In a situation where perpetrators went unpunished, the inhabitants felt their security was in danger. The threats and rumors of removal created a powerful state of anxiety and insecurity on the site, resurrecting the traumas of the past. The threats of re-development thus exacted their own form of violence. The labor of the negative showed the extent of its potency -much before being executed, and whether or not executed in the final moment, it was already productive in the present.
The fate of the cemetery was of key concern, besides the issue of security in spaces of return on the hills. 'Before they remove us, they have to show us where they take ours (the buried victims of the massacre). Because if the cemetery stays here, it is a way to destroy evidence of what they did. We won't leave until they show us where they are taking ours. ' A local administrator outside the settlement confirmed the re-development plan. 32 Despite his admission that one of the reasons people want to stay at the site is to 'be close to those they lost in the massacre', he said the removal should not be a problem since it is lawful 'to move cemeteries.' A process of delinkage was at play.
When I came back in April 2015, the Bugendana site and its inhabitants were still there, but so were the lingering fears of displacement and the talk of the airport. The word had it that abazungu (white people) came in February 2015 to assess the area for construction. Others said that the CNDD-FDD held a meeting in the commune recently where 'they told the population [their supporters] that if they elected them in 2015, this project of the airport would be concretized.' Another man recounted the same: 'They told the population this Sunday that this airport they have been waiting so long for is coming now, they can testify.' And yet, whether the airport plans were mere threats, or whether these were real plans that might indeed materialize, they were already productive in their mere potentiality. 'This idea of airport' made people feel 'powerless' and 'afraid,' a young man explained.
The threats of re-development and (re)displacement produced a dense transcript of mistrust towards the state and its motives. Though the official reasons for dispersal were beneficent, people questioned such projections of state benevolence. Many suspected 'hidden agendas' were at play: 'It is true,' the informal chef de site suggested, 'there is a government's program to destroy the site…It is not only this site, if you heard
[about] Mutaho, Ruhohoro. They are trying to destroy all the [IDP] sites and then invent unrealistic projects like here -an international airport. But we realized this was just a way to threaten us.' 'I don't think there is any [development] project,' a young girl, a supervisor in the local secondary school concluded, 'It is just a political project, to take us out of here.' 'Some among the officials, some who will talk to you privately, they would say "To be honest, we want you to leave because of the massacres, it is kind of a reminder, we want these massacres to be forgotten," two young men told us. In people's minds then, development served a number of purposes at once, being a threat to some, a promise to others. Political reasons of silencing the past were usefully married to political promises to CNDD-FDD supporters in the surrounding communities ahead of the 2015 elections.
In Bugendana, the labor of the negative proceeds in a slightly different way from its typical understanding as 'active not knowing' of a violent past, the not-daring to state the obvious. The 'law of silence' 33 does not hold up in this space, which if anything is unique in the active presence of the past, voiced and marked, etched onto the landscape in the form of the memorial and regular commemoration. But Bugendana also shows that exposure is insufficient if it is not coupled with a public system of recognition and protection. We are reminded, as we are with all the different cases, that it is not the exposure of the secret that matters but the type of revelation that does justice to it. The physical reminders at Bugendana are there but they are still lying in a space of precarity.
The Bugendana inhabitants are vulnerable as they hold no titles to the land, the site is government-owned. It is this precarity, the real potentiality of delinkage and erasure, that shows where power lies, rather than the law of silence as Taussig would have it. It is not public secrecy, but public lack of a protective legal structure that creates the ability for the government to proceed 'as if not.' The clash of materialities -the undesirable and transient settlement pitched against the desirable and substantial infrastructural development -underlines the vulnerability not only of the site, the inhabitants and their cemetery, but the fragility of memory as it is threatened with physical decoupling from place through which it is remembered. 34 33 Taussig, supra n 3 at 6. 34 Filippucci 'accords great centrality to the materiality of place, arguing that past violence is remembered in the places of violence because it is remembered through them.' Quoted in: The (dis)placement of the remains mattered, just as it did in Kivyuka. Here too the labor of the negative was constituted through their misplacement and the resulting delinkage.
But unlike in Bugendana, the delinkage in Kivyuka was not from a place through which the events were properly remembered. The struggle in a sense was an anterior one, it was ontological at heart as it concerned the very designation and demarcation of proper place where these remains should rest. Kivyuka saw repeated delinkage of its remains from an appropriate form and space of remembrance, first in form of mass graves during the civil war, and later in the form of either proposed disposal or relocation to an unmarked site after the war.
In the end, the exhumed remains were salvaged for an uncertain future. They were The continued lack of public recognition and protection of civilian sites of massacre in Burundi has important repercussions but as we have seen, it does not mean these sites have not been revisited, reconstituted, untended. Many have become part of everyday life as markets, toiled fields, courtyards or environs of public institutions. In some 44 Werbner, supra n 15 at 1. 45 Vanderlick and Batungwanayo, supra n 22 at 4. 46 http://burundi-agnews.org/genocide/burundi-genocide-1972-pres-de-500-fosses-communesidentifiees/ (accessed on March 2,2016). 47 Vanderlick and Batungwanayo, supra n 22 at 4 instances, local communities have erected memorials, organized informal commemoration and/or struggled for official recognition. The preceding sections offered a fine-grained look at such local-level action and struggle over the tracing and making of a mark over that which remains.
Equally importantly, the case studies demonstrated the ways in which the labor of the negative has actually transformed and proceeded post-war. The indexes to the past that do exist in the landscape are being eroded in multiple and perhaps more insidious ways.
Importantly, such labor is not always the result of a purposeful plan, but rather often the result of the lack of any protection or proper mapping mixed with political disincentives.
These new, subtler dynamics are well expounded through the struggle between materialities-the threat posed to memory through the layering of build-up, whether accidental, purposeful, or merely intimated.
'Violence leaves traces,' writes Schramm, but so does peace building and post-war reconstruction. 48 Memory of violence is 'inscribed onto space' but so are efforts at postwar integration, physical and social. The post-war space is thus where reminders of violence and objects of peace building and reconstruction intermesh, and at times clash.
By focusing on interaction and layering, the study differs from literature focused squarely on violence's traces or the affective states created by these. 49 The focus lies instead on the physical and affective geography produced through layering materiality created during transition in the name of development and integration on the side or on a sign that the dynamics we have reviewed above will be reversed? There are a number of reasons why we need to be cautious with our optimism. The TRC has been politicized and compromised since its inception, and the recent political crisis (April 2015-) has made any meaningful progress difficult. What we witness in Burundi is an ongoing and entrenched system of impunity buttressed by a lack of political will to deal with the past and the recent crisis-related abuses.
First, the TRC is perceived as an institution lacking independence and one over which the dominant party retains control. 51 The mandate of the commission has been widely criticized by both domestic and external actors as it fails to reflect key preferences arising from the 2009 National Consultations on transitional justice. 52 Second, the new TRC was installed just before a controversial election has plunged the country into an ongoing political crisis, in which the state is again implicated in a violent and repressive way. The Commission has officially been in its preparatory stage, but it appears stranded by the political deadlock, with little detectable activity..' Third, the TRC mandate is expansive when compared to other Commissions such as those of Sierra Leone and South Africa. 53 Among its objectives, the TRC sets out to 'identify and exhume all mass graves' and is expected to 'take measures to protect them and to allow for exhumations and reburials.' 54 The immensity of the task coupled with the factors mentioned above makes this proposition unlikely. Instead, the Commission will likely have to be selective in its approach. 55 Last but not least, other continuities persist , and namely that unmarked mass graves are being produced again. The recent political crisis has created its own layers of grievance, killings and disappearance. 56 There are reasons to believe that the existing system of impunity will be extended to cover these crimes through the application, yet again, of immunité provisoire. 57 . 60 The UN is investigating reports of nine other mass graves and two cemeteries where bodies of victims were allegedly buried.
forged, one eerily reminiscent of the second phase discussed above whereby all violence is carefully suppressed. The graves are not a mystery and witnesses exist but they do not speak out because 'the policemen who were there that day intimidated them.' 'It is a secret between us and the commune [emphasis added],' suggested one of the employees of the municipality. 61 The world knows too and pays attention. Nonetheless, it does so without placing the latest disappeared into the larger historical context and without taking any meaningful action. This poses the pressing question of what sort of truth is indeed being built in the international public-one of exposure of the secret (even that being very partial) or a revelation that also does justice to a violent past?
Conclusions
By way of conclusion, what can we learn about public memory, commemoration and transitional justice more broadly from a case defined by decades of deadlock and inaction on the past? First, the paper presents a unique, bottom-up excavation of the ways in which 'compromised transitions' actually affect memory and shape the physical record of violence. It refocuses our attention on local level struggles and the interface between unofficial and official commemorative practice. This perspective pushes us away from a focus on 'absences' and 'lack' still dominant in the literature on both Burundi and other deadlocked transitions. In turn and second, such analysis opens to view labors of the negative e-forms of effacement of the past-that differ from both cases of outright memory suppression and state-sponsored official commemoration . As shown, in Burundi a repressive strategy has given way to a proliferation of more varied and subtler labors of the negative after the war. Nonetheless the overall effect is consistent, the epochs though different mutually reinforce erasure of memory in a multiplicity of forms.
The case of Burundi also urges us to reconsider the links between public secrecy, silence and power. Taussig has invited us to look beyond forms of knowledge at forms of active not-knowing, which can be equally productive of power. Yet the cases studied here show us powerfully a different sort of labor of the negative at play-one proceeding not only through public secrets and active silences, but at times despite voice and despite a most stark exposure of the secret in the form of unearthed remains. The ability to proceed as if not, to negate the past, might no longer be the product of active suppression but rather the weight of absence, the lack of protection and procedure reflective of the broader lack of political will. In Burundi it is the real potentiality of delinkage and erasure of memory that shows where power lies, not the law of silence. The clash of materialities-those of memory and development-reveals this dynamic most clearly.
At the three different sites that we have overviewed, the inhabitants are unequivocal in arguing that what matters is the form of the material trace etched into public recognition. Physical exposure is not enough, it is the manner of revelation that alone can restore power and voice to the victims and their relations. What remains mattersit is present, it is known, and at times it is even unearthed and exposed-and yet it still remains to be revealed. For actors such as the TRC, this means that fact-finding must be coupled with a system of designation, protection and commemoration. Importantly, exposure without revelation is not simply ineffective or insufficient, it serves to produce and reproduce symbolic violence through the delinkage, displacement and mistreatment, and effacement of memory that accompany it. The future of Burundi's sites of violence is highly uncertain, compounded both by the political crisis and the nature of the Commission set up to protect them.
What can interpretive work through public secrecy and materialities teach us about post-war memory more broadly, in other divided societies and deadlocked transitional
